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 A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONSTUCITON LABOR MARKET IN CHINA 
 
An Tingyu and Watanabe Tsunemi 
Kochi University of Technology 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Expansion of construction industry has been a leading contributor to the rapid development of 
Chinese economy these years; however, the foundations of construction labor market are being deteriorated 
fast. This could be seen from both the worsening of construction enterprises’ business environment and the 
severe construction labor conditions in recent years. This research attempts to explore some promising 
approaches for current Chinese construction to get out of this dilemma from a sustainable development view.  
Current scheme that strictly prohibits ‘illegal’ labor contractors and pushes corporatization among them 
in order to regulate construction labor market in China has been proved to be a failure. It could be judged by 
the extremely difficult implementation on most construction sites by general contractors (GCs) and 
subcontractors (SCs), particularly the latter. One of the root causes is found to lie in the current existing 
subcontracting systems, which neglect the potential development of subcontractors and fail to provide them 
with incentives for good performance as expected. Hence, new strategies and practical scheme ought to take 
the better ongoing development of subcontractors into consideration. 
A new conceptual scheme for GC and SCs involving construction subcontracting business is proposed in 
this paper, mainly including the enlargement of subcontracting business scope and the introduction of 
cooperation into the existing competition mechanism. Then tentative analyses are conducted to validate that 
the new scheme could provide economic incentives for involved parties (particularly subcontractors) in 
today’s business environment with many uncertainties (e.g. workflow unreliability) threatening their better 
ongoing development. It then concludes that the new scheme could help contributing a mutually beneficial 
subcontracting business environment for both GC’s and SCs’ development for current Chinese construction 
industry. Furthermore, it could lead to the fundamental culture change of the existing adversarial relationship 
into trust and win-win relationship.    
 
KEY WORDS: subcontracting, incentive, uncertainty   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Chinese construction industry has so far enjoyed 
a good opportunity for development, which has 
already been a leading contributor to the Chinese 
national economy. During the period from 2006 to 
2010, the building construction industry in China has 
recorded a consistent strong year-by-year growth. It 
is expected to continue to grow during the period 
from 2011 to 2015, particularly in residential, 
commercial, industrial, and institutional sectors.  
 
However, contrary to the expansion of Chinese 
construction, its foundations are being deteriorated 
fast. This could be seen from both the worsening of 
construction enterprises’ business environment and 
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Figure 1 Deterioration of construction industrial foundations 
                                                              
the severe labor conditions in recent years (Figure 
1). It has significantly influenced the employment 
growth in the Chinese construction sector. It has 
already been noticed that the potential of 
construction abilities in absorbing labor force sees a 
tendency to be faltered or slowed down, even with a 
decline in the rate of employment in some year (Hu, 
2002; Qian, 2004). One of the most important 
reasons must lie in the universally negative image 
of construction industry. It greatly hinders the 
recruitment and retention of construction laborers in 
recently China, especially among the growing new 
generation of migrant laborers (Cai, 2009; Liang, 
2010). Construction industry employers in China 
seem to much lag behind other industries in how 
they conduct their people practices. This gap must 
be closed; otherwise the recruitment and retention 
of employees will become chronic problems in the 
near future (Charles, 2007).  
 
Those explanations argue that the future 
construction development in China calls for more 
labor-oriented strategies. The government should 
place considerable importance on maintaining a 
competitive and flexible construction labor market. 
In other words, it is urgent for Chinese construction 
not only to pay close attention to improve current 
employment situation, but to raise the issue how to 
foster a sustainable construction labor market as a 
vital element in its future development. It is 
certainly a complicated and systematic task to be 
carefully tackled, since any frequently changeable 
or short-sighted interventions or regulations would 
not only make the existing problems unresolved but 
in turn bring new fatal problems and even aggravate 
the tension between the construction industry and 
its labor force. Thus, it calls for a sustainable view 
for development (Wells, 2003). 
 
Special attention is drawn on labor 
subcontracting which is the universal practice of 
construction employment. Its status and 
implications to construction industrial development 
should be considered carefully since many labor 
problems are severely blamed to be caused by 
‘informal’ labor subcontracting behaviors. Thus, the 
Chinese government determined to strictly prohibit 
‘illegal’ labor subcontractors and push 
corporatization among them. However, it does not 
work as well as expected in practice, according to 
the empirical observations on sites in the previous 
study (An, 2010a). An (2010b) argues that one of 
the root causes lies in the current existing 
subcontracting systems, which neglect the potential 
development of subcontractors and fails to provide 
them with economic incentives for good 
performance as expected. And thus, new adjustment 
or even reform of current subcontracting systems is 
required for improvement.  
 
With regard to the adversarial work culture 
along with the construction supply chain (CSC), 
particularly in today’s competitive environment, 
lessons learned from the Japanese construction 
industry tell a valuable approach as to promote the 
long term relationships between general contractor 
(GC) and subcontractors (SCs) regarding the 
subcontracting business (An, 2011). However, how 
to realize it concretely needs further investigations.  
 
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND 
HYPOTHESES 
This research attempts to explore labor-based 
strategies and adaptable measures in practice for the 
Chinese construction industry from the perspective 
of sustainable development. 
 
2.1 Research objective 
A tentative conceptual scheme for developing the 
Chinese construction labor market sustainably will 
be put forward in this paper. Considering that the 
current existing subcontracting systems provide 
insufficient incentives for consistent 
implementation in practice, efforts will be made on 
exploring the potential economic incentives of the 
proposals for those concerned parties.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses tree  
The hypotheses tree (Figure 2) summaries how this 
study proceeds with the tentative proposals aiming 
at sustainable development of construction labor 
market in China.  
 
Firstly, regarding the current strict prohibitions 
of ‘informal’ labor subcontractor teams and 
sub-subcontracting business under the existing 
systems in China, it argues that the informal 
employment and multi-layer subcontracting 
systems (MLSS) must have their rationalities of 
existence (Assaad 1993; Aelim, 2010). Without a 
rational response to those schemes, any rigid 
interventions will finally fail to perform well in 
practice. To overcome some negative repercussions 
of those schemes, one crucial issue is to facilitate 
the subcontractors’ development based on mutual 
understanding to create reciprocal business 
environment for both general contractor (GC) and 
subcontractors (SCs). It has positive meanings for 
both industrial structure adjustment and sustainable 
improvement of construction labor employment. To 
achieve that, current subcontracting systems should 
release the restriction on subcontracting business 
scope, and meanwhile introduce cooperative work 
relationship into the existing competition 
mechanism. It is believed to contribute to realize 
the efficient and effective construction production 
systems with just-in-time and efficient assembler 
(GC) and qualified suppliers (SCs) with better 
ongoing development in future. To be more 
concrete, some strategies for GC and SCs could be 
promoted in practice, such as enlarging 
subcontracting business scope, and promoting a 
relative stable working relationship between GC 
and some certain SCs. 
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Figure 2 A conceptual scheme in the form of 
hypotheses tree for the sustainable development of 
Chinese construction labor market    
 
3. TENTATIVE VALIDATION 
Tentative analyses are conducted in this part to 
validate that the new scheme could provide 
economic incentives for those involved parties 
(particularly subcontractors) under today’s 
competitive business environment with various 
uncertainties threatening their development. 
 
3.1 Critical issue as to facilitate subcontractors’ 
development   
In the previous studies (An, 2010 & 2011), one of 
the deeper roots for construction labor problems in 
China has been found to be lay in the current 
overall subcontracting systems with excessive 
restriction on the scope of subcontracting business. 
It largely ignores the ongoing development of 
subcontractors, who suffer from the uncertain and 
futureless business environment. Situation becomes 
even worse in view of adversarial relationships up 
and down the construction supply chain. Recent 
practical scheme without true understanding of 
subcontractors is proved to be a failure in 
improving laborers’ poor conditions. In turn it 
brings negative side effects, such as the current 
irrational industrial production structure with few 
developed and competent professional 
subcontractors. In a word, it is urgent to take 
subcontractors’ development into consideration in 
order to improve construction laborers’ conditions 
sustainably and fundamentally.  
 
As a matter of course, we could enlarge the 
subcontracting business scope from previous 
labor-only to materials and other business, and try 
to convert the adversarial culture by introducing 
cooperation into current competitive mechanisms 
through long term work relationships. The key issue 
is how to motivate and convince those concerned 
parties to be better integrated in the construction 
supply chain to manage the uncertainties during the 
construction process (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Main sources of uncertainties during the 
construction process 
Internal  Personal competence 
Integrity of the involved parties  
Differing economic interests of the 
involved parties 
External Labor 
Suppliers 
Clients 
Planning authorities 
Environmental (i.e. market) uncertainties  
   
There are many sources for the uncertainties 
during the project progress, which could be mainly 
examined from external and internal levels (Figure 
3.1). This paper will focus on the analysis of a 
major and universally existing internal cause as the 
workflow reliability. It is mainly influenced by the 
degree of work plan reliability by GC, and 
reliability in providing necessary resources by SC. 
It can directly result in the task uncertainty and 
contract uncertainty during the transaction process 
between GC and SC, the degree of which will 
become even bigger due to organizational 
uncertainty and natural uncertainty. SCs are 
generally more fragile or vulnerable to those 
uncertainties in construction production. They are 
in the downstream of construction supply chain, 
and their further development is greatly dependent 
on the fundamental accumulation on projects level. 
 
•Degree of work plan reliability by GC
•Reliability in providing necessary resources by SC
•Design change initiated by clients.
•Unforeseen legal requirements, etc.
Internal 
External
direct
task 
uncertainty
contract 
uncertainty
Natural 
uncertainty
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uncertainty  
Figure 3.1 Major causes for uncertainties during the 
construction process 
With regard to laborers, one of the induced 
problems by the instability of construction 
production is the fluctuation of labor demands 
during the construction process. Correspondingly, 
the laborers provided by subcontractors are 
fluctuated with a degree of uncertainty. Without a 
proper ability to coordinate by GC and SCs, from 
the project perspective, it could easily result in the 
waste of labor waiting or labor shortage in use, both 
of which have detrimental effects on the 
achievement of project objectives. From the labor 
force perspective, it is prone to the arbitrary use and 
exploitation of laborers by subcontractors, which is 
frequently taken as a major measure to cope with 
uncertainties inherent in the labor supply business. 
 
Again, we would like to stress on the significant 
influence of those uncertainties on the development 
of subcontractors at a firm-level. It is obvious that 
those potential waste or loss brought by the 
instability of construction production actually could 
not be eliminated, but in most cases it is just simply 
transferred through subcontracting from the upper 
layer (GC) to the downer layer (SC) along with the 
construction supply chain. Instead of the 
conventional behavior of risk transfer from up to 
down, the authors pursue other management 
approaches to strive for stability amid the 
construction supply chain. In that way, how to deal 
with the uncertainties related to work plan by GC 
and resource allocating by SC during the production 
process plays a significant role in facilitating the 
better ongoing development of subcontractors. By 
that, it may provide an opportunity to improve labor 
force’s employment conditions continuously and 
sustainably.  
 
3.2 Understanding subcontractors’ economic 
behaviors  
Generally speaking, subcontractors behave to 
maximize their profits according to the ways in 
which they are measured. The basic rules are almost 
set in the subcontract based on a fixed unit price or 
lump sum contract. That should be kept in mind for 
better understanding of their business environment. 
Hence, it is necessary to examine how the proposed 
approaches (e.g. long term work relationship) will 
affect subcontractors’ economic behaviors. In this 
section, a tentative effort is made through exploring 
the economic behaviors of GC and SC with regard 
to resource allocating along with the project process. 
Many negative effects caused by ineffective 
resource utilization have been shown on 
construction sites, such as longer waiting time for 
work assignment, labor lay-up, and so on. They 
could ultimately reduce the work flow reliability, 
which is particularly vital to SC’s business. 
 
To be specified, we focus on the dependent 
relationship between the degree of work plan 
reliability by GC and SC’s reliability in providing 
the resources as mentioned before. Intuitively, it 
could be deduced that the more reliable a project 
work plan is, the more willing for SC to allocate 
resources readily and efficiently. Thus, the work 
flow tends to be more reliable with fewer 
uncertainties. Vice versa, the less reliable the work 
plan is, the less reliable resource allocating is likely 
to be. It would ultimately lead to a vicious non-trust 
working relationship.  
 
Therefore, it is significant to promote working 
together by GC and SC. To achieve that, a better 
mutual understanding of their economic behaviors 
is required. The following model aims at helping 
GC understand the economic motivation of SC, and 
thus helping to simulate some supply chain 
management approaches which could contribute to 
the work stability amid an increasing and 
unavoidable practice of subcontracting.  
3.2.1 Prior knowledge on subcontractor’s 
economic behaviors  
Given that the contract price between client and GC 
is enough reasonable so that GC does not have to 
worry about its payment by client, but is just 
concerned with how to complete project work 
efficiently with well coordination by SC. We have 
some prior knowledge in mind of subcontractor’s 
behaviors according to empirical observations from 
the previous studies. 
• SC’s reliability of providing resources seems to 
be largely dependent on the reliability of work 
plan by GC. 
• SC is liable to provide fewer resources than 
demanded in practice, leading to the perception 
of unreliable SC. 
• SC prefers to subcontract more services such as 
materials, equipment, and so on, rather than 
labor-only provision.   
– Through that, SC seems to be less 
influenced by the uncertainties inherent in 
subcontracting business, meanwhile, has a 
higher potential to gain profit.   
 
3.2.2 The net income of subcontractors over 
one planning period in one single project 
The net income of SC in any particular project over 
one planning period could be roughly equal to the 
total income from work actually performed minus 
the total cost of the resources actually occurred. 
Derived from Sacks (2004), let: 
• /A Dk R R= , in which AR  denotes the actual 
resources provided by SC, and 
DR  is the 
quantity of resources demanded by GC to 
complete the planned work; 
• /A Dq W W= , in which AW  denotes the 
quantity of actual work made available, and 
DW  is the quantity of work demanded. 
Then k  is perceived as SC’s reliability in resource 
providing, and
 q  could be understood as GC’s 
reliability of project work plan by GC. Thus, SC’s 
net income is: 
{ } ( )min ,   
( )
=
( )
D M D s
D M S
D M D S
I Total Income Total Cost
k q W U C kW C
kW U C C k q
qW U C kW C k q
= −
≈ − −
− − <
 − − ≥
(3.1) 
 
In this scenario of resource allocation, SC 
knows the unit price (U ) for the work in the 
subcontract, the unit costs of materials (
MC ), and 
the cost of the resources per unit of work planned 
(
sC ), and the quantity of work demanded ( DW ) by 
project manager from GC. The economic behavior 
for SC is to set the value of k that will optimize its 
net income.   
 
3.2.3 Analyses of the parameters affecting 
subcontractor’s economic behaviors 
Figure 3.2 shows the relations between SC’s net 
income, resource allocating strategy and GC’s plan 
reliability, given that ( ) / 1/ 4M S SU C C C− − =  for 
simplified calculation. It could then be inferred that:  
• SC’s net income is dependent on the 
reliability of project work plan by GC (q ), 
resulting in SC’s different behaviors when 
providing resource (k ). 
As q  declines, not only the expected income ( I ) 
will be reduced, but the loss (below the vertical 
axis) is more easily incurred. Then it could be 
inferred that a rational SC must try to estimate the 
value of q  for maximizing income, and then 
choose resource allocating strategy more 
appropriately (i.e. set k q= ). Then it could explain 
that SC is liable to providing fewer resources than 
demanded if the work plan is less reliable. 
 
From the perspective of SC, non-trust work 
relationships will lead to its behavior like not to be 
of honesty or integrity. It is consistent with our 
perception that subcontractors tend to provide less 
resources demanded by project mangers, such as 
cheating on labor and materials (jerry building).   
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Figure 3.2 Relations between SC’s net income ( I ), 
resource allocating strategy ( k ), and GC’s work plan 
reliability (q ) 
 
Another interesting result is:   
• The vulnerability of SC to the unreliability of 
work plan by GC could be influenced by its 
subcontracting business scope. 
If SC supplies labor only in its subcontracting 
business (labor-only subcontractor), the slope in 
Figure 3.2 will become steeper. It means that SC 
becomes more vulnerable or sensitive to the degree 
of reliability of the work plan ( q ). On that 
occasion, with the same value of q , SC needs a 
bigger value of k  to obtain the same profit 
(usually we consider the right half of the curve). In 
other words, if the subcontractor supplies a 
significant proportion of the materials needed for 
the work, its vulnerability is decreased. Here 
vulnerability means the extent to which changes 
(the reliability of work plan in this case) could 
affect SC’s income. 
 
3.2.4 Impacts of work plan reliability  
The actual value of q  occurs with uncertainty 
rP ( )q  in practice. Since the value of q  varies 
over the multiple planning periods, if a frequency 
distribution can be collected, then the expected 
value of q  is possible to be estimated. It would be 
much valuable for SC, but it could only happen 
under a long term working period. In practice, even 
if subcontractors can not get access to the records of 
the value of q  for each project, they usually have 
a mental impression of the plan reliability in each 
project. As can be inferred, under a stable and long 
term work relationship, this kind of estimation 
could be more accurate and helpful for a 
subcontractor in its resource allocation.  
 
3.2.5 Summary 
SC is likely to allocate resources in any project 
according to its perception on GC’s work plan 
reliability. Furthermore, in most cases, the capacity 
of resources allocated is prone to being lower than 
that demanded since the potential loss of supply 
more is greater than that of supply less. The model 
also indicates that in order to reduce the work flow 
reliability, GC and SC could cooperate regarding 
the work plan and execution under long term 
relationships. It would motivate both of them to 
become trustful partners.  
 
3.3 Exploration of game relation between GC 
and SC  
However, even the model shows the significance of 
working together, any exchange relationship 
between a buyer and supplier is likely to happen in 
practice. That is to say, the subcontracting in 
construction is in fact a series of games, in which 
project manager (buyers) and SCs (sellers) seek to 
optimize their returns.  
 
3.3.1 Game behaviors between GC and SC  
In the previous section, we explain SC’s tendency 
of dishonest behaviors in resources allocating such 
as to provide fewer resources than demanded by 
work plan, to overbook its resources, etc. However, 
this tendency could also be acknowledged by 
project manager in practice, who generally has the 
ability and responsibility to coordinate SC’s work. 
A likely response by project management is to 
demand more resources than needed in order to 
counteract this situation. Intuitively, this would 
have a predictable result of damaging SC’s 
confidence in resource allocation, which will 
exacerbate the problems over time. Even worse, the 
excessively competitive strategies will spur the 
situation to come to the final equilibrium at 
lose-lose (Figure 3.3), resulting in the non-trust 
work relationships. This mutual-effect behavior 
(game relation) between GC and SC certainly could 
not be neglected when pursuing for strategies to 
facilitate SC’s development. That is to say, 
subcontracting in construction production in fact is 
a series of games, in which project manager 
(buyers) and SCs (sellers) seek to optimize their 
returns by ordering resources and allocating 
resources.  
 
Figure 3.3 The consequence of competitive strategies 
with the final equilibrium at lose-lose 
 
According to the frequency of cooperation, 
there can be two kinds of games: 
• short term and never or rarely repeated 
(one-off game) 
• long term and with degrees of repeatability 
(repeated game) 
This following section is trying to explain the 
mechanism of non-trust working relationship, 
explore economic incentives to change, and put 
forward the strategies or efforts that could be done 
by GC and SC to prevent from the worst result.  
 
3.3.2 Formulation of the one-off game scenario 
between GC and SC  
We will exemplify the game behaviors of GC and 
SC through modeling the allocation resources at the 
start of planning period in a project. Two players 
are project manager from general contractor (GC) 
and the subcontractor (SC). The players make 
‘moves’ (referred to as actions) one after the other 
through the repeated cycles of the game.  
    
In each round of game, GC will set the work 
amount that is to be performed by SC in each 
period based on the project plan. Correspondingly, a 
rational SC will evaluate the demanded work 
amount that is likely to actually become available, 
and then take actions to supply the proper amount 
of resources.  
    
Since the actions are taken sequentially, this 
process turns out to be a series of dynamic games. 
What is needed to stress here is that both GC and 
SC have imperfect knowledge about the outcome in 
terms of the work amount that will actually be 
completed until it happens. 
 
This one-off game in each round between GC 
and SC is a dynamic game with incomplete 
information. In this game, the project manager must 
take an action with imperfect knowledge of the 
actually work amount that are made available (
AW ) 
before the next planning period. Similarly, the 
subcontractor also has imperfect knowledge about 
whether the project manager has demanded more, 
exact or fewer resources than necessary. In a word, 
the action collections of GC and SC are supposed to 
be greatly influenced by the degree that they know 
about the actually available work amount. The work 
plans are not always necessarily reliable. In other 
words, it is often unknown with uncertainty at the 
beginning of each planning period. In reality, the 
amount of work that will actually become available 
at a future date can not be entirely ‘known’ by 
PM(GC)  
Demand more  
resources than needed  
SC 
Provide fewer  
than demanded  
Information 
Asymmetry  
either GC or SC. In turn, it is also unlikely to 
happen that either of them would have absolutely 
no knowledge of the likely value of q  at all.  
 
(1) Harsanyi transformation  
To explore the impact of plan reliability on the 
expected behaviors of GC and SC, we will use 
information set with regard to the plan reliability. It 
will then make it possible to model the scenario in 
which each player either knows or does not know 
the variable value of ‘nature’ (N ), in this case the 
value of q , which measures the amount of work 
that will actually become available.  
 
This process of adding ‘nature’ as a player in 
the game is known as the Harsanyi transformation
1
. 
John Harsanyi won the Nobel Prize in economics 
for devising a method for analyzing games of 
incomplete information. Games in which the 
payoffs are not common knowledge are known as 
games of incomplete information. In that case, the 
players remain ignorant of the strategy adopted by 
their opponent until the play is made by the 
Harsanyi transformation. He proposed to consider a 
player who has different payoffs under different 
circumstances as a player of different types. It 
means that in this kind of game, a player must form 
beliefs about the strategy that an opponent will play 
and the player must also form some beliefs about 
the type of game he/she is playing. The game is 
then modeled as though ‘nature’ moves first and 
chooses the type of that player.  
 
In this scenario, the incomplete game between 
GC and SC will then be converted into two stages 
of dynamic games, with an extensive form shown in 
Figure 3.4, where
 
                                                  
1
http://isc.temple.edu/economics/Econ_92/Game_Lect
ures/10th-IncompInfoStatic/incomplete_info_01.htm 
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Figure 3.4 The one-off game between GC and SC by 
Harsanyi transformation 
 
We state again that the values of q  at the left 
of the tree represent the range of possible results of 
the ratio of the work that will actually become 
available (in terms of work available) to the amount 
of work planned. At the first stage, the nature will 
choose q , and then the next stage will become a 
static game of complete information between GC 
and SC.  
 
The GC’s possible actions are detailed at the 
second level in Figure 3.4 by d , which represents 
the ratio of the work demanded to the work that GC 
estimates will actually become available (in terms 
of work plan). Here, the value of d  is also 
modeled by discrete values: demand for less work 
amount than estimated ( 0.9d = ), exactly the 
amount estimated ( 1d = ), and more than estimated 
( 1.1d = ). 
 
In response to GC’s demand, SC can select the 
amount of resources to be allocated according to the 
amount required for the work demanded. Here, k  
represents the radio of resources supplied to those 
demanded ( 0.9k = ), exactly the amount required 
( 1k = ), or more than demanded ( 1.1k = ). The 
latter value tells a situation in which the SC has 
resources available, and is willing to allocate more 
of them in the hope that more work amount than 
expected will actually become available, so they 
would be utilized profitably. 
Then the action set of each one-off game is: 
1 {(0.9,0.9),(0.9,1),(0.9,1.1),
(1,0.9),(1,1),(1,1.1),
(1.1,0.9),(1.1,1),(1.1,1.1)}
A =
    
 
(2) Utilities for GC and SC 
The utilities or payoffs for each player are 
calculated at the end node of each branch of the tree. 
Here, we assume that the utility of GC is to be the 
total work amount that will be actually completed 
in the planning period. Thus, the expected utilities 
for GC and SC are: 
r
r r
0
U min( , )
(U ) min( , ) P ( )
P ( ) P ( )
GC
GC
dk
dk
q dk
E q dk q dq
q q dq dk q dq
∞


=

=

 = +

∫
∫ ∫
    (3.2)         
[ ] r
r r
0
U min( , )( ) suppose 1
(U ) min( , )( ) P ( )
( ) P ( ) P ( )
SC M S D
GC M S
dk
M S
dk
q dk U C kC W
E q dk U C kC q dq
U C q q dq dk q dq kC
∞


= − − =

= − −

  = − + − 
 
∫
∫ ∫
                                     (3.3)  
Note: The labor cost is independent of the amount of 
work performed. 
 
(3) An example of probability distribution of q  
In practice, even the value of q  could not still to 
be estimated, construction professionals would not 
estimate a continuous probability distribution, but 
rather use discrete values at significant intervals. 
Here, for simplifying the model analysis, we 
suppose that the probability distribution of q  is 
given in table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 An example of probability distribution of q  
q  0.9 1 1.1 
rP ( )q  0.3 0.6 0.1 
 
3.3.3 Equilibrium and discussion 
Then we could have the payoff matrix (Table 3.3) 
of this one-off game between GC and SC under the 
information sets of plan reliability. 
 
The equilibrium of this game is (1.1, 0.9), 
which means that GC is likely to demand more 
resources, and SC is prone to supply with less 
resources. A game theory ‘equilibrium’ as used here, 
represents a set of strategies taken by the players 
that result in a situation where neither player has 
anything more to gain by changing only his or her 
own strategy, so long as the other player does not 
change their strategy. 
 
However, under long term work relationships 
Table 3.3 Payoff matrix of the one-off game between GC and SC 
   SC 
GC 
0.9 1.0 1.1 
0.9 (0.81,0.81( ) 0.9 ))M SU C C− −  (0.9,0.9( ) ))M SU C C− −  (0.963, 0.963( ) 1.1 )M SU C C− −  
1.0 (0.9, 0.9( ) 0.9 ))M SU C C− −  (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C− −  (0.98, 0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C− −  
1.1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C− −  (0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C− −  (0.98, 0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C− −  
 
with GC’s strategy moving to 1d = , the 
equilibrium of this game would reach at (1.0, 1.0). 
It means that a trust work culture would be 
probably created between GC and SC. Moreover, as 
can be seen, the utilities for both GC and SC would 
increase to a certain extent. It is supposed to be a 
better equilibrium which may serve as an incentive 
for the involved players. It again stresses the long 
term relationships could be a valuable approach to 
motivate subcontractors. 
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
(1) Make SC more reliable in the resource 
allocation through more cooperative production 
management techniques based on the mutual 
understanding between GC and SC. 
(2) Strategies of efforts could be done by GC:  
• Enlarge the subcontracting business scope, 
like materials and even design, not only labor 
resources (this is in accordance with the 
previous model with incentives from SC) 
• Rebuild the risk management ideology with 
shifting part of the risks back to themselves 
(GCs) 
– Risk should be apportioned in accordance  
with the ability to control the risk 
– For example, the formula of work 
payment for SC adding risk shifting factor 
Of course, it must be agreed by both through 
communication and mutual understanding of the 
pay-off. 
• Assign more work to fewer subcontractors  
(3) Strategies or efforts could be done by SC 
• Develop the abilities to deal with 
subcontracting business, including not only 
labor management, but the business 
management, risk management, construction 
technology, design ability, etc. It is not only 
consistent with GC’s strategy but could 
reduce the impact of task uncertainty or 
fluctuation of work on their income, which is 
essential to the sustainability and 
development of themselves. 
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